the addendum

1
Addendum to the Group of Experts on the DRC’s interim report
(S/2012/348) concerning:
Rwandan government violations of the arms embargo and sanctions regime
I. Introduction
1. Pursuant to its oral briefing presented to the Sanctions Committee on 13 June 2012 and in
fulfillment of its commitment to provide timely information on arms embargo and sanctions
violations to this same Committee, the Group presents this addendum to its interim report
(S/2012/348).
1
 
2. Since the outset of its current mandate, the Group has gathered evidence of arms embargo and
sanctions regime violations committed by the Rwandan Government. These violations consist of
the provision of material and financial support to armed groups operating in the eastern DRC,
including the recently established M23, in contravention of paragraph 1  of Security Council
resolution 1807.
2
 The arms embargo and sanctions regimes violations include the following:
• Direct assistance in the creation of M23 through the transport of weapons and soldiers
through Rwandan territory;
• Recruitment of Rwandan youth and demobilized ex-combatants as well as Congolese
refugees for M23;
• Provision of weapons and ammunition to M23;
• Mobilization and lobbying of Congolese political and financial leaders for the benefit of
M23;
• Direct Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) interventions into Congolese territory to reinforce
M23;
• Support to several other armed groups as well as FARDC mutinies in the eastern Congo;
• Violation of the assets freeze and travel ban through supporting sanctioned individuals.
3
3. Over the course of its investigation since late 2011, the Group has found substantial evidence
attesting to support from Rwandan officials to armed groups operating in the eastern DRC.
Initially the RDF appeared to establish these alliances to facilitate a wave of targeted
assassinations against key FDLR officers, thus significantly weakening the rebel movement (see
                                                         
1
 The Group’s submitted its interim report to the Committee on 18 May 2012, who in turn transmitted it to the
Security Council on 21 June 2012.
2
 Paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 1897 decides that  “all States shall take the necessary measures to
prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer, from their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag
vessels or aircraft, of arms and any related materiel, and the provision of any assistance, advice or training related to
military activities, including financing and financial assistance, to all non-governmental entities and individuals
operating in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;”
3
 See official list of designated individuals and entities for the Sanctions Committee 1533  at
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/pdf/1533_list.pdf 2
paragraphs 37 & 38 of interim report). However, these activities quickly extended to support for
a series of post-electoral mutinies within the FARDC and eventually included the direct
facilitation, through the use of Rwandan territory, of the creation of the M23 rebellion. The latter
is comprised of ex-CNDP officers integrated into the Congolese  army (FARDC) in January
2009. Since M23 established itself in strategic positions along the Rwandan border in May 2012,
the Group has gathered overwhelming evidence demonstrating that senior RDF officers, in their
official capacities, have been backstopping the rebels through providing weapons, military
supplies, and new recruits.
4. In turn, M23 continues to solidify alliances with many other armed groups and mutineer
movements, including those previously benefiting from RDF support. This has created enormous
security challenges, extending from Ituri district in the north to Fizi territory in south, for the
already over-stretched Congolese army (FARDC). Through such arms embargo violations,
Rwandan officials have also been in contravention of the sanctions regime’s travel ban and assets
freeze measures, by including three designated individuals amongst their direct allies.
5. In an attempt to solve the crisis which this Rwandan support to armed groups had exacerbated,
the governments of the DRC and Rwanda have held a series of high-level bilateral meetings
since early April 2012.  During these discussions, Rwandan officials have insisted on impunity
for their armed group and mutineer allies, including ex-CNDP General Bosco Ntaganda, and the
deployment of additional RDF units to the Kivus to conduct large-scale joint operations against
the FDLR. The latter request has been repeatedly made despite the fact that: a) the RDF halted its
unilateral initiatives to weaken the FDLR in late February;
4
 b) RDF Special Forces have already
been deployed officially in Rutshuru territory for over a year; c) RDF operational units are
periodically reinforcing the M23 on the battlefield against the  Congolese army; d) M23 is
directly and indirectly allied with several FDLR splinter groups; and  e) the RDF is re-mobilizing
previously repatriated FDLR to boost the ranks of M23.
Elevated standards of evidence
6. In light of the serious nature of these findings, the Group has adopted elevated methodological
standards. Since early April 2012, the Group has interviewed over 80 deserters of FARDC
mutinies and Congolese armed groups, including from M23. Amongst the latter, the Group has
interviewed 31 Rwandan nationals.  Furthermore, the Group has also photographed weapons and
military equipment found in arms caches and on the battlefield, as well as obtained official
documents and intercepts of radio communications. The Group has also  consulted dozens of
senior Congolese military commanders and intelligence officials as well as political and
community leaders with intricate knowledge of developments between the DRC and Rwanda.
Moreover, the Group has communicated regularly with several active participants of the exCNDP mutiny, the M23 rebellion, and other armed groups.  Finally, while the Group’s standard
methodology requires a minimum of three sources, assessed to be credible and independent of
one another, it has raised this to five sources when naming specific individuals involved in these
cases of arms embargo and sanctions regime violations.
II. Rwandan support to M23
                                                         
4
 The last FDLR officer to be assassinated was Captain Theophile, the S3 of the Military Police Battalion, in late
February 2012.  3
7. Since the earliest stages of its inception, the
Group documented a systematic pattern of
military and political support provided to the M23
rebellion by Rwandan authorities. Upon taking
control over the strategic position of Runyoni,
along the Rwandan border with DRC, M23
officers opened two supply routes going from
Runyoni to Kinigi or Njerima in Rwanda, which
RDF officers used to deliver such support as
troops, recruits, and weapons. The Group also
found evidence that Rwandan officials mobilized
ex-CNDP cadres and officers, North Kivu
politicians, business leaders and youth in support
of M23.
A. Direct assistance in the creation of M23
through Rwandan territory
8. Colonel Sultani Makenga deserted the FARDC
in order to create the M23 rebellion using
Rwandan territory and benefiting directly from
RDF facilitation (see paragraph 104 of interim
report).  On 4 May, Makenga crossed the border
from Goma into Gisenyi, Rwanda, and waited for
his soldiers to join him from Goma and Bukavu.
Intelligence sources, M23 collaborators and local politicians confirmed for the Group that RDF
Western Division commander, General Emmanuel Ruvusha, welcomed Makenga  upon his
arrival to Gisenyi. The same sources indicated that Ruvusha subsequently held a series of
coordination meetings with other RDF officers in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri over the following days
with Makenga.
9. According to ex-CNDP and FARDC
officers, also on 4 May, Colonels Kazarama,
Munyakazi, and Masozera, and an estimated
30 of Makenga’s loyal troops departed from
Goma crossing into Rwanda through fields
close to the Kanyamuyagha border. Several
FARDC officers, civilian border officials, and
intelligence officers stationed at
Kanyamuyagha confirmed that they saw clear
boot tracks of Makenga’s troops crossing the
border into Rwanda only a few meters away
from an RDF position on the Rwandan side.
These same sources also recovered several
FARDC uniforms discarded by the deserters at
that location the same night.  
Image 2: Map of the transport of weapons and
troops from Makenga’s home on 4 May 2012
Image 1: Colonel Makenga’s home and
private dock on Lake Kivu in Bukavu 4
10. A second group of Makenga’s loyal troops deserted the FARDC ranks in Bukavu, also via
Rwanda. Three former M23 combatants who took part in the operation told the Group that ahead
of his desertion, Makenga had gathered about 60 troops under the command of Major Imani
Nzenze, his secretary, as well as Colonels Seraphin Mirindi and  Jimmy Nzamuye in his
residence by Lake Kivu in Nguba neighborhood of Bukavu (see image 1). At 20:30 on 4 May,
the two large motorized boats transported the 60 troops and several tons of ammunitions and
weapons 200 meters across the lake to the Rwandan town of Cyangugu (see paragraph 118 of
interim report). The same sources indicated that upon arrival to Rwanda the boats were sent back
once again to Makenga’s residence to recover the remainder of the weapons and ammunition
(see image 2). According to one of the M23 combatants who later deserted the movement, and
Congolese intelligence services, the evacuated weapons included  such heavy weapons as
katyusha rocket launchers, RPG 7, and 14.5 mm machine guns, some of which were brought
from Makenga’s weapons caches at Nyamunyoni (see paragraph 118 of interim report).
11. The three former M23 combatants who participated in the operation also told the Group that
upon arrival in Cyangugu, RDF and Rwandan police brought them to a military camp. The RDF
subsequently provided them with full Rwandan army uniforms to be worn while traveling within
Rwanda. The troops and the military equipment were afterwards loaded onto three RDF trucks,
and transported via the towns of Kamembe, Gikongoro, Butare, Ngororero, Nkamira and brought
to the RDF position at Kabuhanga. This military position is situated on the DRC-Rwanda border,
near the village of Gasizi in Rwanda (roughly 27 km north of Goma).  This ex-combatant
testimony was corroborated by several sources interviewed by the Group, who all attested to the
movement of troops from Rwanda into the DRC:
a) Four local leaders interviewed separately in Kibumba personally witnessed Rwandan
soldiers offloading equipment and soldiers from RDF trucks and jeeps at Gasizi on those
same dates.
b) Two Congolese border agents
observed the RDF trucks which
brought the troops and military
equipment to Gasizi.
c) A civilian intelligence officer
reported that the troops had been
brought to Gasizi in trucks.
d) An FARDC internal intelligence
report states that the troops were
brought to join Makenga at
Gasizi (see annex 1).
12. Several former M23 combatants also
told the Group that General Ruvusha
accompanied Makenga to meet with his
troops in the RDF base at Kabuhanga
(see image 3). RDF commanders ordered
the Congolese soldiers to put on once
again their FARDC uniforms and
Image 3: M23 travel through Rwanda facilitated by the
RDF 5
provided them with plastic sheets, food, soap, and kitchen utensils. RDF officers also instructed
the soldiers to remove any signs identifying Rwanda, such as labels on uniforms and water
bottles.
13. That night, RDF officers ordered the FARDC deserters to offload and transport the weapons
brought from Bukavu through the Virunga National Park, to Gasizi on the DRC side,
5
 between
Karisimbi and Mikeno volcanoes.  On 8 May, these soldiers joined up with the mutineers who
came from Masisi territory to the assembly point at Gasizi.  Military and police officers, as well
as local authorities from Kibumba reported on the arrival of the mutineers from Masisi near the
border, and the movement of Makenga’s troops from Rwanda into DRC. A  local authority
gathered reports from Rwandan civilians who had been forced to carry the weapons from Gasizi,
in Rwanda, to the DRC border. After Ntaganda’s and Makenga’s groups merged, they advanced
further through the park and took control of Runyoni on 10 May to officially launch military
operations of the M23 rebellion (see paragraph 104 of interim report).
6
B. RDF recruitment for M23
14. Once M23 established their
positions near the Rwandan border at
Runyoni,
7
 the RDF began facilitating
the arrival of new civilian recruits and
demobilized former combatants of the
FDLR to strengthen the ranks of the
rebels.
Civilian new recruits
15. The Group interviewed 30 Rwandan
nationals who had been recruited into
M23 and managed to escape.
Interviewed separately, each confirmed
that they had been recruited in Rwanda.
While some interacted with civilian
“sensitizers”, most stated that RDF
officers directly participated in their
recruitment process. M23 collaborators, ex-CNDP officers, politicians, ex-M23 combatants, and
Congolese refugees in Rwanda, informed the Group that a wide network of mobilization has
been established in the main Rwandan towns bordering DRC, as well as in refugee camps,
targeting Rwandan nationals and Congolese refugees for recruitment.  Recruitment focal points
operating at Kinigi, Ruhengeri, Mudende, Gisenyi, Mukamira, and Bigogwe, are tasked with
identifying and gathering young men for recruitment and handing them over to RDF soldiers.
Two Congolese refugees, as well as a visitor of Nkamira refugee camp (situated 27 km from
                                                         
5
 The corresponding village along the border in DRC is also called Gasizi.
6
 CNDP issued an official communiqué announcing the creation of M23 on 6 May 2012, just after the desertion of
Colonel Makenga.
7
  The CNDP held a stronghold in Runyoni in 2008. See S/2008/773 paragraph 64 b)
Image 4: RDF recruitment and supply routes for M23 6
Gisenyi in Rwanda) stated to the Group that there has been a systematic campaign in the camp to
encourage young men to join M23.  
16. Former M23 combatants from Rwanda stated that the main transit point for recruitment is the
RDF position at Kinigi, where recruits are regrouped and sent to DRC (see image 4). This pattern
has also been independently confirmed Congolese intelligence services and a former RDF
officer. According to some of the recruits, they often receive a meal in Hotel Bishokoro, which
belongs to General Bosco Ntaganda and his brother at Kinigi. Afterwards, RDF soldiers escort
large groups of new recruits to the border and send them into the DRC.
17. According to FARDC officers, Congolese intelligence and civilian sources in Kibumba a
second point of entry for recruits from Rwanda to join M23 is the town of Njerima,
8
 located on
the Rwanda-DRC border southwest of Kinigi (see annex 2). Local traders who sell their goods at
Njerima told the Group that during the last week of May, M23 recruits passing through the
village included refugees from Masisi as well as Rwandan nationals. Recruits arrive by bus at
Ruatano at about a kilometer from Njerima. From Njerima walking paths lead to Kabare in DRC,
which is located within the DRC’s Virunga National Park, in between the volcanoes Mikeno and
Karisimbi. According to park authorities, Kabare is a natural clearing in the forest where rebel
presence has been observed since the last week of May 2012.
18. The Group has not been able to establish the total numbers of recruits, as upon arrival to
Runyoni they are immediately deployed among the various M23 positions situated on seven
distinct hills.
9
 According to Rwandan former M23 combatants, groups that depart from Kinigi,
are composed of 30 to 45 recruits at a time. All recently recruited former combatants observed
other civilian recruits from Rwanda upon arrival to Runyoni, as well as saw new recruits arriving
from Rwanda every second day. One M23 deserter deployed at Ntaganda’s position counted 130
-140 recruits from Rwanda when he arrived, while another from Chanzu  counted about 70
recruits from Rwanda. For their part, two ex-M23 combatants from Kavumu saw 60 recruits.
19. All ex-M23 combatants confirmed that there were children under the age of eighteen
amongst the waves of recruits. The Group interviewed two fifteen-year old boys who had
escaped from M23. While one ex-combatant reported that he saw 28 children at Ntaganda’s
position, another witnessed at least 20 minors at M23’s position at Chanzu. As for most of the
M23 recruits, these children are given a weapon and undergo very rudimentary training before
immediately being sent to the battlefield.
Demobilized ex-FDLR
20. The RDF has also deployed demobilized former FDLR combatants to reinforce M23.
According to several former senior FDLR officers, all former  combatants of Rwandan armed
groups, upon completion of the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission’s
program, are automatically enrolled in the RDF’s Reserve Force, commanded by General Fred
Ibingira. As members of the Reserve Force, they can be ordered to deploy on behalf of the RDF
                                                         
8
 In 2008 Njerima also served as entry point for infiltrations from Rwanda into DRC. See S/2008/773, paragraph 64
b).
9
At Runyoni, the mutineers established positions on Runyoni, Chanzu, Kanyanja, Jomba, Kavumu, Mbuzi, or
Bugina hills. 7
on short notice. Former RDF officers, politicians, and M23 collaborators indicated that ex-
FDLR combatants from within the RDF’s Reserve Force have been re-mobilized and deployed
to Runyoni alongside M23. Active FDLR officers in DRC also confirmed this re-mobilization of
previously repatriated FDLR combatants.  According to Rwandan former M23 combatants who
escaped from Runyoni, small groups of former demobilized combatants arrive every day and are
dispatched between the various M23 positions.
10
21. The Group interviewed two former FDLR who had previously been demobilized in Rwanda,
and were sent to Runyoni in May 2012. Both belonged to the Reserve Force. One was deployed
after being called by RDF officers, while the other
was invited to join a meeting with other
demobilized soldiers when he was instructed to
depart for military service. Both were taken to the
military base at Kinigi, where they received
weapons and ammunition, and were escorted to
Runyoni in the same way as the civilian recruits.
Both testified that they have been sent to Runyoni
in a group with 70 other people, among which 31
were demobilized soldiers. Upon arrival, they saw
11 other demobilized soldiers at Chanzu (see
paragraph 123 of interim report).
C. RDF logistical support to M23
22. The RDF has been providing military
equipment, weapons, ammunition, and general
supplies to M23 rebels. FARDC and ex-CNDP
officers, as well as all ex-M23 combatants
interviewed by the Group reported that RDF officers have been backstopping the logistics of the
rebel movement from the military bases at Kinigi and Njerima. Through the supply routes going
from Rwanda to Runyoni, M23 have received not only large amounts of weapons and
ammunition, but also food, tents, fuel, oil, plastic sheets, and medicines. Ex-combatants also
attest to the fact that some RDF uniforms are also provided to M23. The Group photographed
one M23 deserter with RDF boots and camouflage pants (see image 5). According to three exM23 combatants, RDF troops have also assisted with the evacuation of injured soldiers. Once
brought to the border, they are sent to hospitals and health clinics in Ruhengeri. Furthermore, exCNDP officers, ex-RDF officers, and senior FARDC commanders told the Group that nearly all
M23 officers have evacuated their families and possessions to Rwanda.
                                                         
10
 These ex-FDLR combatants re-mobilized from Rwanda should not be confused with the FDLR splinter group
“Mandevu” which is also fighting alongside M23. See paragraphs 100-102 of the interim report.
Image 5: Ex-M23 soldier who deserted with
RDF uniform  8
23. All thirty ex-M23 combatants from Rwanda
interviewed by the Group stated that the RDF forced
them to carry one box of ammunition and one weapon
each when crossing into the DRC. Near the DRC border
crossing with the Rwandan village of Gasizi, the Group
obtained a box of ammunition, which FARDC officers
and ex-M23 combatants attested had been provided by
the RDF and was destined for the M23. The metal casing
included 7.62 mm tracer ammunition for AK-47 rifles
which were painted with a green tip, in contrast to
FARDC ammunition (see image 7). One displaced
villager from Runyoni, interviewed by the Group in
Bunagana, stated that M23 rebels forced him to carry the
same ammunition boxes from Chanzu to Runyoni.
Current RDF officers confirmed for the Group that this
type of ammunition did indeed belong to the RDF.
24. Furthermore, the Group photographed anti-tank
rounds recovered from the battlefield near Kibumba (see
annex 3). Colonel Makenga’s arms cache at
Nyamunyoni contained over 300 75 mm anti-tank canon
rounds (see paragraph 118 interim report and annex 4).  According to several Congolese senior
commanders and logistics officers, neither the anti-tank rounds found on the battlefield above
nor those from Makenga’s cache have ever been distributed by the FARDC.  
25. Ex-M23 combatants have also surrendered with
AK-47 rifles which are distinct from those used by
the FARDC. The Group photographed one such rifle
which has a larger barrel muzzle than those used by
the FARDC (see image 7).
D. Rwandan officials mobilizing support to M23
26. Senior Rwandan officials have also been directly
involved in the mobilization of political leaders and
financial backers for M23. Based on interviews
conducted with M23 members, ex-CNDP officers
and politicians, intelligence officers, FARDC senior
commanders, the Group established that Rwandan
officials have made extensive telephone calls and
organized a series of meetings with Congolese
politicians and businessman to promote and rally
support for M23.
Telephone communications
Image 6: 7.62 mm tracer rounds
provided by the RDF to the M23 (on
right) compared with FARDC
ammunition (on left)
Image 7: AK-47 rifle surrendered by exM23 soldier9
27. Since May, Rwandan authorities have undertaken wide-ranging efforts to convince ex-CNDP
officers and former CNDP and RCD politicians to join M23. Several politicians told the Group
that senior Rwandan Government officials had directly contacted them. One politician and one
ex-CNDP officer acknowledged to the Group that RDF Captain Celestin Senkoko,
11
 the personal
assistant of Rwandan Minister of Defence General James Kabarebe,
12
 had called on several
occasions to convince them to become a part of M23. Another politician  told the Group that
Senkoko and Jack Nziza, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, called and threatened
him after he refused to join M23.
Still another politician interviewed
by the Group has been contacted
by Kabarebe, Senkoko, and Nziza,
all three requesting him to
mobilize support for M23.
According to three other
politicians, Charles Kayonga, RDF
General Chief of Staff, has called
politicians and invited them for a
meeting about M23 in Kigali.
Former CNDP General Laurent
Nkunda, has also been a key
mobilizer of M23 and has been
calling ex-CNDP officers to
convince them to join the new
rebellion (see paragraph 107
interim report).
RDF-convened meetings
28. According to intelligence
sources, politicians, and M23
collaborators, on 23 May 2012,
Senkoko organized a meeting,
with the participation of RDF
officers and 32 community
leaders, mostly CNDP cadres, in
Gisenyi at the residence of CNDP
member Gafishi Ngoboka.
Senkoko introduced himself as the
                                                         
11
 Captain Celestin Senkoko, a native from Goma, has previously worked for General Jacques Nziza, and currently
works as the personal assistant for the Rwandan Minister of Defence James Kabarebe. For years, he has been
executing specific aspects related to Rwandan foreign policy in the DRC. In particular, he played an instrumental
role in the distribution of weapons by Tous pour la Paix et le Développement (TPD) designated for targeted
sanctions by the Committee for these same acts on 1 November 2005
(http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8546.doc.htm)
12
 James Kabarebe is the Rwandan Minister of Defence, formerly the Rwandan Chief of Staff, has traditionally been
in charge of the “Congo file” within the Rwandan Government.
Image 8: Resignation letter of CNDP provincial ministry
following instructions from the RDF in Ruhengeri meeting 10
representative of Kabarebe and conveyed the message that the Rwandan government supports
M23, whose new war was to obtain a secession of both Kivus. After showing the territory to be
liberated on a map, he instructed politicians to convince all Rwandophone army officers
operating in the Kivus to join M23 and stressed the need to for M23 to  gain more popular
support and begin collecting funds. According to intelligence sources, politicians, and M23
collaborators, Nziza came to Gisenyi and Ruhengeri at the same period, to supervise both
military and mobilization activities related to M23.
29. Another similar M23 meeting with Rwandan authorities took place on  26 May 2012 in
Ruhengeri, Rwanda, at Hotel Ishema. According to intelligence sources and to politicians with
close ties to Kigali, the RDF organized the meeting for CNDP politicians, which was chaired by
Bishops John Rucyahana
13
 and Coline, both senior RPF
14
 party leaders. The aim of the meeting
was to convey the message that the Rwandan Government supports M23 politically and
militarily. All Rwandophone politicians and officers were instructed to join M23, or otherwise
leave the Kivus. In particular, CNDP politicians have been asked to resign from the North Kivu
Governorate and to withdraw from the Majorité Présidentielle (MP).
15
 Following the decision
taken during the meeting at Ruhengeri, CNDP Minister of Justice Francois Ruchogoza resigned
from the Governorate in North Kivu on 2 June (see image 7). After considerable pressure to
declare CNDP’s withdrawal from the MP, Edouard Mwangachuchu, the head of the CNDP
political party, refused to do so. CNDP politicians siding with M23 and acting from within
Rwanda, made such a declaration nevertheless (see annex 5).
30. According to politicians, individuals closely associated to M23, and  to Congolese
intelligence services, on 2- 3 June, and once again on 9-10 June, representatives of the business
community from Goma, comprised mostly of owners of fuel stations represented by Desiré
Rwabaenda and Dieudonné Komayombi, met General Kabarebe in Kigali, to discuss mobilizing
financial contributions to M23.  
E.  RDF units directly reinforcing M23 during operations in the DRC
31. Former M23 combatants, FARDC officers, local authorities, intelligence services, and exRDF officers informed the Group that RDF units themselves have  also been deployed to
reinforce M23 for specific operations at Runyoni. The following sources have provided detailed
accounts of such direct military involvement of the RDF:
                                                         
13
 John Rucyahana has been the head of the Anglican Church at Ruhengeri, president of the Bagogwe community
from Rwanda, and President of the Rwandan Unity and Reconciliation Commission.
14
 The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is the ruling party of President Paul Kagame.
15
 A participant to the Gisenyi and Ruhengeri meetings informed the Group that the conclusions of the meetings
included the creation of various cells in Gisenyi, Masisi, Goma, and Ruhengeri, in charge with collecting financial
contributions to purchase supplies for M23. 11
a) An RDF soldier who surrendered on 14 June 2012 from Ntaganda’s position in Runyoni
stated that his unit was trained for two weeks in Kanombe military camp in Kigali, before
being deployed in Runyoni already during the first week of March. Having previously
fought as a CNDP soldier under Laurent Nkunda and as part of joint RDF FARDC
Amani Leo operations the soldier in question was recruited alongside several other
Rwandan ex-CNDP
soldiers by an RDF
Captain in the beginning
of February. The mission
of his 80 men strong unit
was to prepare the arrival
of Ntaganda in Runyoni.
On its way to Runyoni
via Kinigi the unit was
joined by an estimated
150 more RDF soldiers.  
b) FARDC officers
informed the Group that
they had captured a
Rwandan soldier who
had been working for
Ntaganda while
gathering information on
the FARDC deployments
at Kibumba at the end of
April in preparation of
the arrival of M23 (see
image 9).
c) An M23 officer who
surrendered from
Ntaganda’s position at
Runyoni stated that he
witnessed how RDF
troops supported M23 during their operations. He said that the RDF use the path going
from Kinigi into Chanzu, or the path going through Njerima to Kanyanja, where
Ntaganda’s position is located. The same source reported that RDF troops have been
deployed in the park not far from Kanyanja to assist the rebels during combat operations
against the FARDC. He estimated that there were around 150 RDF troops deployed at
Kanyanja.
d) Another ex-M23 officer who surrendered from Ntaganda’s position at Runyoni told the
Group that he personally witnessed how one RDF battalion came to  reinforce the
mutineers after a FARDC helicopter bombarded their positions. The RDF unit passed
through Ntaganda’s base and went to support Zimurinda on Bugina hill.
Image 9: Extracts from FARDC internal intelligence file on an
RDF soldier captured while conducting spy operations prior to the
establishment of the M23 in Rutshuru 12
e) After deserting the M23 from his position at Mbuzi hill, another ex-M23 officer told the
Group that he witnessed RDF units come to support the rebels on three occasions after
FARDC advances.
f) An officer who surrendered from the position at Runyoni reported that he witnessed the
arrival of four waves, each of about 100 RDF soldiers and 30 recruits.
g) An ex-M23 soldier recruited
in Rwanda reported that
among the 40 RDF soldiers
who accompanied the
recruits until the DRC
border, 20 continued
marching and remained with
Ntaganda at his position
after changing into FARDC
uniforms.
h) An ex-RDF officer asserted
that two RDF units have
been deployed to Kinigi, and
have specifically been tasked
with periodically reinforcing
the M23 in the DRC.  
i) Radio communications
between RDF and M23
intercepted by FARDC and
shared with the Group,
demonstrate that an RDF
officer acknowledges having
received a visit of M23
officers on Rwandan
territory, while an M23
officer states that they
already had received 400 –
500 soldiers in
reinforcement from the RDF and requests additional troops (see image 10).
16
 
j) Several displaced leaders from areas currently under the control of M23 told the Group
that the rebels occupying their home villages have been joined by other soldiers identified
as Rwandan because of their distinct military equipment, notably their green high boots,
bright spotted uniforms, waterproof tents and packed food items.
k) Two civilians from Chanzu interviewed by the Group in May saw Rwandan soldiers also
crossing into the DRC, initially wearing RDF military uniforms who subsequently
changed into FARDC uniforms.
32. Since the beginning of 2011, two joint RDF and FARDC units have been deployed in
Rutshuru territory to conduct operations against the FDLR.
17
 Though these units have not taken
                                                         
16
 This cassette has been placed in UN archives for future reference.
Image 10: Extract from M23 radio intercepts requesting
external reinforcements 13
part in hostilities alongside M23, FARDC officers told the Group  that they feared such a
scenario.
F. Rwandan officials responsible for support to M23
33. Throughout the Group’s investigations, it has systematically gathered testimonies from
former M23 combatants, M23 collaborators, ex-RDF officers, Congolese intelligence, FARDC
commanders, and politicians which affirm the direct involvement in the support to M23 from
senior levels of the Rwandan government.
18
 
a) General Jacques Nziza, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, supervises
all military, financial, and logistic support as well as mobilization activities related to
M23. He has recently been deployed to Ruhengeri and Gisenyi to coordinate M23
assistance and recruitment.  
b) General James Kabarebe, the Rwandan Minister of Defense, with the support of his
personal secretary Captain Celestin Senkoko, also is a central figure in recruitment and
mobilizing political and military support to M23. Kabarebe has often been in direct
contact with M23 members on the ground to coordinate military activities.
c) General Charles Kayonga, the RDF Chief of Staff manages the overall military support
to M23. Kayonga is frequently in communication with Makenga and oversaw the transfer
of Makenga’s troops and weapons through Rwanda.  
d) The military support on the ground has been channeled by  General Emmanuel
Ruvusha, RDF Division commander based in Gisenyi, as well as  General Alexi
Kagame, RDF Division commander based at Ruhengeri. Both facilitate recruitment of
civilians and demobilized soldiers to M23 as well as coordinating RDF reinforcements in
Runyoni with M23 commanders.
e) Colonel Jomba Gakumba, a native of North Kivu, who used to be an RDF instructor at
the Rwandan Military Academy at Gako, was redeployed to Ruhengeri since the creation
of M23, where he has been in charge of commanding locally military  operations in
support of M23.  
34. Ex-RDF officers, politicians, M23 collaborators also informed the Group that Ntaganda and
Makenga have been regularly crossing the border into Rwanda to carrying out meetings with any
of the above-mentioned senior RDF officers at Kinigi in order to  coordinate operations and
supplies. Two Rwandan nationals who surrendered from M23 witnessed such meetings between
Makenga and senior RDF officers at Kinigi, on several occasions. Those same sources also
stated that former CNDP chairman General Laurent Nkunda, officially under house arrest by the
Rwandan government since January 2009, often comes from Kigali to participate in these
meetings.  
III. Rwandan support to armed groups and mutinies linked to the M23
                                                                                                                                                                                         
17
 See paragraph 116 of the Group’s 2011 final report (S/2011/738).
18
 As per paragraph 6 above, the Group has identified the following individuals based upon the testimony of at least
five separate credible and independent sources.   14
35. In addition to RDF support to M23, the Group has gathered evidence indicating that
Rwandan officials have been supporting other armed groups and mutinies often using Ntaganda
and other ex-CNDP commanders to foster such alliances. Acting through these armed groups,
Rwandan officials managed to weaken the FDLR through a series of targeted killings of FDLR
officers. M23 officers and armed group leaders have acknowledged these alliances with the
common aim of destabilizing the central Government.
A. Nduma Defence of Congo – NDC
36. Rwandan officials have been in direct contact with NDC commander Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi,
and supported him in organizing the targeted killing of FDLR Montana battalion commander
“Lieutenant Colonel” Evariste Kanzeguhera  alias “Sadiki” ” (see paragraphs 37 and 61 of
interim report). According to intelligence officers, two former NDC combatants, and close NDC
collaborators, on 4 November 2011, Ntaberi travelled to Rwanda, with Ntaganda’s facilitation.
Upon arrival to Gisenyi RDF officers entrusted him with the task of killing Kanzeguhera and
gave him money for the operation.  After having killed Kanzeguhera on 20 November 2011,
Ntaberi surrendered to FARDC Sector commander Colonel Chuma Balumisa in Walikale.
Balumisa informed the Group that he had received a direct call from Rwandan head of military
intelligence at that time, General Richard Rutatina,
19
 ordering Balumisa to ensure that Ntaberi
board a plane sent by Ntaganda to Walikale to evacuate him to Rwanda (see paragraph 62 of
interim report).
20
 An NDC deserter in mid-April reported that during the ex-CNDP mutiny,
Ntaberi received telephone calls from Ntaganda and senior Rwandan officials on a daily basis
(see paragraph 93 interim report and annex 6). These communications were confirmed by a
separate NDC collaborator. M23 members acknowledged to the Group  that they are allied to
Ntaberi and the NDC.
B. Forces pour la Défense du Congo - FDC
37. In early 2012, Rwandan officials tasked FDC commanders to assassinate FDLR supreme
commander “General” Sylvestre Mudacumura.  To support them with this operation, Ntaganda
provided FDC with weapons, ammunition, and several trained ex-CNDP officers.  During the
operation against the FDLR Headquarters, carried out on 11 January 2012,  FDC combatants
successfully killed FDLR Chief of Staff Leodomir Mugaragu (see paragraph 38 interim report).
One former FDC officer who participated in the operation told the Group that the FDC received
the support of four Rwandan commando officers deployed to strengthen the FDC for that
occasion. Local authorities in both Masisi and Walikale as well as FDLR officers also confirmed
the direct involvement of the RDF in this attack.
C. Local Defences forces at Busumba
38. Erasto Ntibaturama, a close CNDP ally, is a local militia commander at Busumba in Masisi
territory. His local defense forces, comprised of over 50 men, acted under the command of exCNDP Lieutenant Colonel Gasheri Musanga in support of Colonel Zimurinda’s mutineers in
                                                         
19
 In January 2012, along with three other senior RDF officers, General Rutatina was suspended form his duties and
subsequently placed under house arrest as a result of accusations that he was involved in unauthorized private
business ventures in the DRC.
20
 Colonel Balumisa has been assassinated by Ntaberi during the CNDP mutiny in April 2012, on orders from
Ntaganda, following refusal to ally to the mutineers.  15
northern Masisi. When the mutineers left Masisi, a part of Ntibaturama’s militia followed the
mutineers to Runyoni, including Ntibaturama’s son and CNDP political candidate, Erasto Bahati,
alongside with Musanga. According to ex-CNDP officers and politicians, Ntibaturama had then
crossed the border into Rwanda where the RFP provided him with a residence in Gisenyi.
D. Coalition des groupes armés de l’Ituri - COGAI
39. Rwandan support to armed groups is not limited to the Kivus. In Ituri District, the Group has
confirmed attempts by the RDF to convince FARDC commanders to defect from the Congolese
army and join the newly created  Coalition des groupes armés de l’Ituri - COGAI rebel
movement. FARDC officers have stated to the Group that General Kabarebe made a series of
telephone calls with these instructions in early 2012. COGAI unites former militia members from
different ethnic backgrounds under the leadership of FRPI commander ethnic Lendu “Brigadier
General Banaloki alias “Cobra Matata” (see paragraphs 51 & 52 interim report). According to
FARDC, intelligence sources and COGAI sympathizers, Banaloki has been approached by
prominent members of the Hema community, seeking to create an  alliance against Kinshasa
following the conviction of Thomas Lubanga by the ICC.
40. The same sources along with a Lendu community leader also shared with the Group that a
COGAI delegation travelled to Kigali between 27 May and 4 June 2012. COGAI representatives
met with General James Kabarebe, the Rwandan Minister of Defense. Upon the delegation’s
return to Ituri, it reported back to Banaloki and handed him $15,000 in cash it had received.
E. Union de congolais pour la défense de la démocratie - UCDD
41. The UCDD was established in wake of the creation of the M23 in order to compensate for
Makenga’s departure from South Kivu. The head of the UCDD, Xavier Chiribanya is the former
governor of South Kivu during RPF
control over the Kivus and a longstanding secessionist.
21
 According to
Congolese intelligence sources and
detained political leaders, Chiribanya
has been living under the protection of
the Rwandan government since he fled
from Bukavu in 2003. The same sources
indicated that while in Gisenyi
following his flight from Goma,
Makenga met with Chiribanya to plan
the creation of the UCDD. On 9 May
2012, Chiribanya diffused the news
about the establishment of the UCDD by text message (see image 11).
                                                         
21
 Chiribanya was condemned for his alleged involvement in the killing of former DRC President Laurent Kabila.
He is also one of the founding members of the Mudundu 40 armed group which collaborated closely with the RDF
during their deployments to the DRC between 1998 & 2002. In 2003, Chiribanya launched a secessionist movement
whose aim was to break away Maniema, North Kivu, South Kivu provinces and Ituri district from the rest of the
DRC.
Image 11: Text message circulated by Xavier Chiribanya
on 9 May 2012 declaring his UCDD movement as an ally
of M23 16
42. Chiribanya has subsequently held a series of
meetings with armed group leaders during which he
has claimed full support from the Rwandan
government to pursue open rebellion against Kabila
in order to obtain the secession of the eastern Congo.
One former UCDD member stated that Chiribanya
told him in a meeting on 24 May in Bujumbura that
Rwanda had over 2000 ex-FDLR combatants trained
for their struggle.  According to an official signed
statement of a detained armed group leader,
Chiribanya invited others to meetings in Rwanda “to
harmonize their efforts with the Rwandan
authorities.” The Group obtained a text message
from a UCDD member which confirmed such
invitations (see image 12).
43. Furthermore, according to Congolese intelligence, FARDC officers, and a former UCDD
member, Chiribanya has already provided weapons to
multiple armed groups in Uvira territory as well as Mai
Mai Yakutumba in Fizi territory.
22
 The Group has
obtained text messages of UCCD communications with
the latter (see image 13).  According to several FARDC
officers and intelligence sources, Chiribanya has also
established ties with units of Raia Mutomboki in South
Kivu’s Nindja forest and communicates frequently with
FARDC deserter Colonel Albert Kahasha of the Union
des patriots congolais pour la paix (UPCP) in Southern
Lubero (see paragraphs 126 & 127 of interim report).
Kahasha’s UPCP has facilitated the movement exCNDP deserters seeking to join M23 in Rutshuru.
23
E. Conseil Supérieur de la Paix- CONSUP
44. CONSUP was created in December 2011 following
the elections in order to foment unrest amongst
disgruntled populations who questioned the credibility
of the November vote (see paragraph 128 of the interim report). Unsuccessful legislative
candidates joined forces with senior commanders of former armed groups within the FARDC,
notably the FRF and the CNDP.  In preparatory meetings in the FRF Headquarters in Bukavu in
the early weeks of January ex-CNDP officers Lieutenant Colonel Vianney Kazarama and
Colonel Seraphin Mirindi
24
 represented Colonel Makenga.  During the same meeting, Kazarama
named the future governors and political representatives for the eastern Congo. According to
                                                         
22
 M23 officers confirmed for the Group that they are indeed allied to Mai Mai Yakutumba.
23
 Ex-CNDP Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf Mboneza defected from the FARDC in Beni on 16 June and instead of
joining M23 actually remained with Kahasha and Lafontaine to strengthen the UPCP.
24
 Both officers have subsequently joined the M23 rebellion.
Image 13: Text message between UCDD
members detained and “General”
William Amuri of Mai Mai Yakutumba
Image 12: Text message of UCDD members
about “politically important” meetings in
Ruhengeri, Rwanda 17
detained former CONSUP members, several individuals attending such meetings claimed the
movement had the full support of Rwanda.
45. CONSUP’s initial objective was to spark unrest by agitating members of the political
opposition through urban strikes and protests until staged provocations of the security forces
would lead to the killings of protestors, thus sparking an armed rebellion against President
Kabila. According to several CONSUP members detained before it could take action, following
the uprising in Bukavu, “reinforcements from the RDF were to come from Cyangugu/Rusizi in
Rwanda with the pretext of coming to assist the Rwandophone population or Rwandan citizens
supposedly the victims of persecutions or targeted by the manifestation” (see image 14)
CONSUP leader René Kahukula is currently in hiding in Rwanda according to Congolese
intelligence and FARDC commanders.
F. Ex-FARDC Colonel Bernard Byamungu
46. From the earliest stages of the mutiny in South Kivu, Rwandan Minister of Defence, General
James Kabarebe, provided Colonel Bernard Byamungu with direct operational orders, according
to former mutineers and senior FARDC officers. Three former bodyguards of Byamungu told the
Group that Kabarebe was in consistent communications with Byamungu as he awaited the arrival
of other mutineers from Fizi territory during the first days  of April (see paragraphs 73-77 of
interim report). Another former mutineer personally overheard one of these conversations, which
took place at 22:00 on 3 April 2012, during which Kabarebe called Byamungu to ask about the
current status of preparations for the mutiny and the ambush set up for South Kivu Amani Leo
Operations Commander, Colonel Delphin Kahimbi. The same source indicated that members of
the RDF’s intelligence branch followed up this call on the same number to order Byamungu to
conduct his operation to seize the town of Uvira the following day. When Byamungu began to
run low on supplies, another ex-mutineer who deserted with Byamungu stated that Kabarebe told
Byamungu that he would seek supplies of ammunitions from other armed groups in the
vicinity.
25
  Furthermore, when it became apparent that Byamungu’s mutiny in South Kivu would
not succeed in reaching the provincial capital of Bukavu, according to senior FARDC officers,
Kabarebe made several pleas by phone to senior FARDC officers to ensure Byamungu’s security
and swift return to his command position in Uvira.
G. Ex- FARDC Colonel Innocent Kaina
                                                         
25
 Byamungu was already in communication with the Burundian rebel groups of the FNL and FRONABU to help
facilitate his flight, according to several FNL officers in Uvira territory.
Image 14: Extract from FARDC internal report based on official records of interviews with over a dozen
detained CONSUP members 18
47. Senior FARDC officers told the Group that upon his desertion in Rutshuru territory in early
April 2012, Colonel Innocent Kaina had sought to take control of the border town of Bunagana
and proceed to establish a base at Runyoni.  However, upon taking Bunagana on 8 April 2012,
Kaina and his 80 troops were dislodged on the same day. Ex-CNDP and FARDC officers, local
politicians, as well as a surrendered mutineer told the Group that Kaina subsequently crossed the
border into Rwanda to escape pursuit from the FARDC. The same sources also confirmed that
after spending ten days in Rwanda, Kaina returned to join the mutineers in Masisi (see paragraph
82 of interim report).
IV. Rwandan support to sanctioned individuals
A. General Bosco Ntaganda  
48. Despite M23’s apparent aim to avoid association with Ntaganda, he has esablished a military
position at Runyoni and is still considered as the highest CNDP/M23 commander (see paragraph
105 of interim report). As such, all support to the rebel group also constitutes direct support to a
sanctioned individual.
49. Moreover, the Group found that the
sanction regime’s travel ban and assets
freeze measures placed on Ntaganda have
not been respected by the Rwandan
government. Intelligence officers,
politicians, two close collaborators of the
Rwandan government, an ex-CNDP officer
from Ntaganda’s entourage, as well as a
former M23 combatants from Ntaganda’s
position at Runyoni, all informed the Group
that in the course of the month of May,
Ntaganda crossed the border from Runyoni
into Rwanda several times, and participated
in meetings with high RDF and government
officials in Kigali and Ruhengeri.
50. Furthermore, politicians, ex-CNDP
officers, and intelligence officers informed
the Group that Ntaganda owns a house in Gisenyi where he evacuated his family. He also
partially owns Hotel Bishokoro at Kinigi, officially a property of his brother, used in the
recruitment activities carried out by RDF soldiers for M23. Both Ntaganda’s house and hotel are
still under construction (see image 15). His possessions and investments continue to be managed
by Cubi Wasabahizi, Ntaganda’s relative who operates from Gisenyi.  
B. Colonel Innocent Zimurinda
51. The Group found evidence that Colonel Innocent Zimurinda, currently operating with M23,
travelled to Rwanda for meetings with the Rwandan government. Intelligence sources, an exCNDP officer and two RDF officers confirmed that on 9 April, Zimurinda came to Gisenyi to
participate, alongside with Minister of Defense Kabarebe, and other Rwandan and DRC officials,
in a meeting to address the crisis at the outset of the ex-CNDP mutiny.  
Image 15: Ntaganda’s residence in Gisenyi, Rwanda 19
C. “General” Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi
52. Ex-CNDP officers, intelligence sources, and ex-combatants informed the Group that Sheka
has travelled at least once to Rwanda since carrying out the operation to kill FDLR “Lieutenant
Colonel” Kanzeguhera. Ntaberi was designated by the Sanctions Committee on 28 November
2011.
IV. Rwandan government response
53. In response to recent NGO and media reports alleging Rwandan support to M23, the
Rwandan government has categorically denied them. On 28 May, the Rwandan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs responded by calling such statements “false and dangerous” (see annex 7). In
meetings with the Group, Rwandan government representatives have confirmed this official
position.
54. However, RDF officers have told the Group that M23 recruitment may be taking place within
Rwanda but attributed it to Congolese nationals acting independently. Furthermore, the same
sources stated that among the surrendered combatants of Rwandan nationality, 11 provided false
testimonies about RDF involvement in
their recruitment because they were
tortured by the FARDC. On 22 June 2012,
the Rwandan newspaper, the New Times,
subsequently published a story with
similar claims (see annex 8).
55. The Rwandan government participated
in the Joint Verification Commission
(JVC) established by the Governments of
the DRC and Rwanda to interview 11
Rwandan nationals who surrendered to
MONUSCO on 20 May 2012. At the
conclusion of the interviews on 9 June, the
Rwandans submitted their findings which
attested that they found no evidence in the
testimonies to implicate the RDF in any
support to M23 (see annex 9).
Furthermore, citing a need to return to
Kigali for consultations, the Rwandan
delegation failed to sign the confirmation
of the JVC’s collective findings. On 10
June, the DRC delegation proceeded to
sign a “Procès verbale de carence” along
with a representative of MONUSCO as an
observer in the process (see annex 10). Nevertheless, prior to his return to Kigali, the head of the
Rwandan delegation, RDF Major Sam Ruhunga, signed the official records of interviews for
nine of the eleven Rwandan nationals jointly interviewed by both government delegations (see
image 16).
Image 16: One of nine records of official statements
signed by RDF Major Sam Ruhunga confirming the
testimony of ex-M23 combatants recruited in Rwanda
as part of the JVC. 20
56. In a briefing to the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 21 June, the Ambassador
Joseph Nesengimana stated that the “Government of Rwanda bares  no responsibility,
whatsoever, in the ensuing set of regrettable events and misguided initiatives that ruined prior
constructive efforts and escalated the crisis towards full-blown military confrontation.”
Furthermore, Nsengimana added that “Rwanda has been receiving detailed information on
collusion between and support from FARDC units to FDLR forces” (see annex 11) The M23
rebels made similar accusations in a press communiqué
26
 on 22 may 2012 in which they stated
that they “detain irrefutable proof that FARDC positions have been held by FDLR troops”, while
denying accusations by the DRC government that they have themselves allied with FDLR (see
paragraph 105 interim report and annex 12). The Group will continue to investigate such
allegations, but has not yet obtained or been presented with any substantiated evidence in this
regard.
57. The DRC authorities have presented the Rwandan government authorities with information
regarding RDF support to M23 on several occasions. At the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, on 27 May 2012, during a bilateral meeting between the two countries, DRC authorities
shared detailed accounts of the facilitation provided to Makenga, his troops, and his weapons by
the RDF. Furthermore, on 19 June, the DRC authorities presented the Rwandan Minister of
Foreign Affairs, during her visit to Kinshasa, with a comprehensive report documenting
Rwandan support for M23. To date, the Group has not received any official response or
explanation from the Rwandan government regarding the information provided to it by
Congolese government.  
58. The Group has made extensive efforts to engage with the Rwandan government regarding its
findings, with some limited success. All six members of the Group participated in an official
visit to Kigali from 12-14 May 2012, though the Rwandan government did not receive them for
any substantive meetings to discuss these issues. However, during  a meeting to discuss these
current findings on arms embargo and sanctions regime violations in New York on 25 June 2012,
the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs invited the Group to Kigali to for a second official visit
in order to conduct an exhaustive point-by-point review of the information contained in this
addendum. The Group is eager to accept such an invitation and is committed to clarifying and/or
correcting any information in this addendum in its final report to be submitted to the Committee
in October 2012.
                                                         
26
 CNDP/M23 Press Communiqué 012/M23/CNDP/2012.